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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:25.032075+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354412</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-354412</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:25.035788+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-354412</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-354412"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12905</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-12905</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:25.035821+00:00</updated>
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        <p>The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-&gt;staff-&gt;getId() when $this-&gt;role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-12905"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j9h8-cf5v-78mc</id>
    <title>GHSA-j9h8-cf5v-78mc</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:25.035861+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this-&gt;staff-&gt;getId() when $this-&gt;role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j9h8-cf5v-78mc"/>
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