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  <updated>2026-11-17T03:14:06.931867+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406511</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-406511</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T03:14:06.933864+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-406511</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406511"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9264-jvgf-6w2f</id>
    <title>GHSA-9264-jvgf-6w2f — russh kex_done: Shared-secret callback runs before server host-key verification</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T03:14:06.933899+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: russh</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>A malicious SSH server whose host key is rejected can still cause russh's `client::Handler::kex_done()` callback to execute with the raw key-exchange shared secret. Applications using the callback for its documented protocol-bridging purpose may derive keys, initialize a secondary data channel, or perform another externally visible action before russh calls `check_server_key()` and rejects the server.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>During the initial key exchange, russh calls `kex_done()` immediately after the server proves possession of the presented host key, but before the application decides whether that key belongs to the intended server:</p>
<p>```rust
let shared_secret = newkeys.kex.shared_secret_bytes();
handler
    .kex_done(shared_secret, &amp;newkeys.names, session)
    .await?;</p>
<p>// Initial KEX only checks trust afterwards.
if let Some(certificate) = server_host_certificate {
    if !handler.check_server_key(&amp;certificate.into()).await? {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
} else if let Some(server_host_key) = server_host_key {
    let check = handler.check_server_key(&amp;server_host_key.into()).await?;
    if !check {
        return Err(crate::Error::UnknownKey.into());
    }
}
```</p>
<p>This is in `russh/src/client/mod.rs` at lines 2036-2078 of commit `183a22e8f8f490fa09b6eb7bd044ef99d8c4414f`.</p>
<p>The API documentation describes `check_server_key()` as the important trust decision that prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. It describes `kex_done()` as the callback…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9264-jvgf-6w2f"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128087</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-128087</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T03:14:06.933971+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh</p>
<p>russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From version 0.55.0 until version 0.65.1, the initial key exchange invokes client::Handler::kex_done() with the raw shared secret before check_server_key() accepts the server host key or certificate. A malicious SSH server can therefore trigger application-defined secondary-channel initialization or early data handling even when the server identity is subsequently rejected. Ordinary clients that keep the callback's no-op default or independently defer callback-derived actions until trust is confirmed are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128087"/>
  </entry>
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