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  <updated>2026-11-17T08:59:37.372640+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400485</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-400485</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:59:37.374999+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-400485</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-400485"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115770</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115770</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:59:37.375028+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115770"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6</id>
    <title>GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6 — Pocket ID: Email verification token remains valid after address change, enabling arbitrary verified-email spoofing</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T08:59:37.375088+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>An authenticated Pocket ID user can request an email-verification token while their account uses an address they control, change the account email address, and then redeem the previously issued token. The token is bound only to the user ID, not to the address to which it was sent, and changing the address does not revoke outstanding tokens.</p>
<p>As a result, Pocket ID marks the newly supplied address as verified even though the user never proved control of it. Pocket ID subsequently returns that address with `email_verified: true` in OIDC claims. A relying party that trusts this claim for email-based account linking or provisioning can therefore link the attacker's Pocket ID identity to a victim's existing account, leading to cross-application account takeover.</p>
<p>This was verified against commit `9f559788a44cfea790de360da0a74d4bdf8ca5d5`.</p>
<p>## Preconditions</p>
<p>- The attacker has an ordinary Pocket ID user account.
- Email verification is in use (`emailsVerified=false`, which is the default).
- The user can edit their own account (`allowOwnAccountEdit=true`, which is the default).
- The target address is not already assigned to another Pocket ID user.
- For downstream account takeover, a relying party links or provisions users based on a trusted, verified email address. Applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC `sub` claim are not affected by that downstream consequence.</p>
<p>No administrator privilege, victim interaction, or access to the victim's mailbox is requ…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6"/>
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