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EUVD-2026-385199

2026-10-10T07:48:24.983007+00:00

EUVD-2026-385199

fkie_cve-2026-107825

2026-10-10T07:48:24.983059+00:00

OWASP Coraza WAF is a golang modsecurity compatible web application firewall library. From 3.0.0 until 3.8.0, ProcessURI in internal/corazawaf/transaction.go handles a url.ParseRequestURI failure by retaining the raw URI but leaving QUERY_STRING, ARGS_GET, ARGS_GET_NAMES, and the GET-derived portion of ARGS empty. An unauthenticated attacker can place control bytes in a URI passed directly by integrations such as coraza-spoa, coraza-proxy-wasm, custom FFI hosts, or WASM hosts, causing Coraza to omit query parameters that the downstream integration may still process and allowing rules targeting those variables to be bypassed. The bundled coraza/v3/http integration is not affected because Go net/http rejects such malformed request targets before calling Coraza. This issue is fixed in version 3.8.0.

GHSA-x26q-wvhg-fh4m — Coraza: ProcessURI silently drops QUERY_STRING and ARGS_GET on URI parse failure — defense-in-depth bypass for non-net/…

2026-10-10T07:48:24.983116+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3

## Root Cause

File: `internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`, lines 834–866.

```go parsedURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(uri) query := "" if err != nil { tx.variables.urlencodedError.Set(err.Error()) path = uri tx.variables.requestURI.Set(uri) /* tx.Variables.VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR.Set("1") posRawQuery := strings.Index(uri, "?") if posRawQuery != -1 { tx.ExtractArguments("GET", uri[posRawQuery+1:]) path = uri[:posRawQuery] query = uri[posRawQuery+1:] } else { path = uri } tx.Variables.RequestUri.Set(uri) */ } else { tx.ExtractGetArguments(parsedURL.RawQuery) // only path that populates ARGS_GET tx.variables.requestURI.Set(parsedURL.String()) path = parsedURL.Path query = parsedURL.RawQuery } ... tx.variables.queryString.Set(query) ```

When `url.ParseRequestURI(uri)` returns an error — which Go's stdlib does for any URI containing raw control bytes (`\x00`, `\n`, `\r`, `\t`, other `0x00–0x1F`, `0x7F`) — the error branch silently produces an empty `QUERY_STRING` and an empty `ARGS_GET` collection. The fallback logic that should split on `?` and populate the GET arguments from the raw tail is already present in the source as a commented-out block, referencing a `VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR` variable that was never wired up.

Consequences on the error branch:

- `ARGS_GET` / `ARGS_GET_NAMES` / `ARGS` (union) are **empty** — `ExtractGetArguments` is n…