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  <updated>2026-10-10T04:19:16.623844+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-384779</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-384779</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T04:19:16.670887+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-384779</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-384779"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107388</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107388</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T04:19:16.670927+00:00</updated>
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        <p>music-metadata is a metadata parser for audio and video media files. Prior to 11.16.0, the ID3v2 parser trusts the syncsafe tag-size field and allocates the complete tag body before checking whether the input contains the declared bytes. A truncated file containing only an ID3v2 header can request an allocation approaching 268 MiB; the allocation succeeds, the subsequent read reaches end of stream, the EndOfStreamError is caught internally, and the caller receives a normal metadata object. This issue is fixed in version 11.16.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107388"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jjpr-9cvf-cq55</id>
    <title>GHSA-jjpr-9cvf-cq55 — music-metadata: ID3v2 tag size not validated before allocation, causing memory exhaustion DoS</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T04:19:16.670964+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: music-metadata</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>The ID3v2 parser in music-metadata trusts the tag size field without validation and allocates the full requested buffer before reading. A specially crafted MP3 file with a truncated ID3v2 tag can force allocation of up to 268 MB from a 10-byte file, causing server memory exhaustion. This vulnerability affects all parsers that support ID3v2 tags (MP3, FLAC, DSF, Musepack) and succeeds silently—callers don't see an error.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>**Vulnerable Code Path:**</p>
<p>- `lib/id3v2/ID3v2Token.ts:108` - Syncsafe size read without validation
- `lib/id3v2/ID3v2Parser.ts:122` - Full tag body allocated before reading
- `lib/id3v2/AbstractID3Parser.ts:22` - Allocation happens before stream validation</p>
<p>**Root Cause:**</p>
<p>The ID3v2 parser reads a syncsafe integer representing the tag size (maximum 268,435,455 bytes or 0x0FFFFFFF) and immediately allocates a buffer of that size without checking:</p>
<p>1. If the tag size exceeds the remaining file size
2. If the tag size exceeds a reasonable maximum
3. If the subsequent read will actually succeed</p>
<p>```typescript
// ID3v2Token.ts:108
const size = ID3v2Header.header.toSize(); // Trusts syncsafe size directly</p>
<p>// Later: Allocates without validation
const tagBody = await tokenizer.readBuffer(Buffer.alloc(size));
// If actual data &lt; size, read fails but allocation succeeded
```</p>
<p>**Attack Mechanism:**</p>
<p>1. File contains valid ID3v2 header with 10 bytes total
2. ID3v2 size field claims 268,435,455 bytes (maximum syncsafe value)
3. Parser all…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jjpr-9cvf-cq55"/>
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