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EUVD-2026-383056

2026-10-07T15:02:34.379504+00:00

EUVD-2026-383056

fkie_cve-2026-105754

2026-10-07T15:02:34.379544+00:00

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.30.0, the /inference/v1/generate endpoint in the disaggregated scale-out path accepts caller-supplied tensors in the features.kwargs_data field, cache identifiers in the features.mm_hashes field, ranges in the features.mm_placeholders field, and wire-selected multimodal field processors without rebinding them to the active model renderer contract. Forged grid geometry, field types, or non-positive placeholder lengths can terminate the shared EngineCore; when an attacker knows or can induce a victim's content hash, forged cache hashes can poison or retrieve cross-request encoder-cache state; and dropped sparse placeholder masks can alter replayed transport semantics. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.0.

GHSA-ph72-cqr5-qpp7 — vLLM: Scale-out disaggregated multimodal transport trusts caller-supplied features

2026-10-07T15:02:34.379583+00:00

Affected: PyPI: vllm

## Affected

- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm` - **Affected versions:** vLLM ≤ 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34)). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the scale-out transport path reaches.

## Summary

vLLM's disaggregated **scale-out** transport splits a multimodal request into a trusted render step (`POST /v1/chat/completions/render`) and a separate generate step (`POST /inference/v1/generate`). The generate route decodes a caller-supplied `features` object — serialized encoder tensors (`kwargs_data`), multimodal hashes (`mm_hashes`), placeholder ranges (`mm_placeholders`), and the internal field-processor selection — and forwards it into the engine **as if it had come from the trusted renderer**, with no rebinding to (or validation against) the active model's renderer contract. Because the two routes are ordinary auth-guarded HTTP endpoints (the `/inference` prefix is registered by default on generate-capable servers), any authenticated caller can submit an otherwise-valid render body with a single forged field.

Depending on which field is forged, this produces:

- an **engine-fatal crash** of the shared EngineCore process (denial of service), reproduced as a CUDA illegal-memory-access, a post-admission rank-mismatch `ValueError`, and a hard `assert` — three independent forged fields (sites 1, 2, 3); - **silent cross-request encod…