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  <updated>2026-10-07T12:00:49.043423+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-382422</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-382422</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T12:00:49.101200+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-382422</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-382422"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104849</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-104849</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T12:00:49.101259+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Tinypool is a minimal Node.js worker thread pool implementation. Prior to 2.1.2, Tinypool reads filename from a caller-supplied options object in pool.run(task, options) without requiring an own property, so a polluted Object.prototype.filename can replace the intended worker module. Applications are affected only when they pass their own second-argument options object to pool.run(); calls without that argument use the trusted default options object. An attacker who can first pollute the prototype can cause the worker pool to load attacker-selected JavaScript and can read or modify task data with the host process's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104849"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-85c8-ppgw-ccpr</id>
    <title>GHSA-85c8-ppgw-ccpr — Tinypool: Prototype Pollution Gadget to RCE in run() options</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T12:00:49.101312+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: tinypool</p>
<p>`tinypool` is a fork of `piscina` and inherited the same prototype-pollution surface. When `pool.run(task, options)` is called, the `filename` option is read from the provided `options` object. If that object does not have an own `filename` property, the lookup falls through to `Object.prototype`.</p>
<p>An attacker who can pollute `Object.prototype.filename` (for example, via a vulnerable `lodash.merge`, `qs.parse`, or similar elsewhere in the application) can make tinypool load and execute an attacker-controlled worker module.</p>
<p>This is the tinypool counterpart to the piscina root discovery [GHSA-x9g3-xrwr-cwfg](https://github.com/piscinajs/piscina/security/advisories/GHSA-x9g3-xrwr-cwfg).</p>
<p>`pool.run(task)` with no second argument is not affected, because `kDefaultOptions.filename` is `null` and the options object is not user-controlled. The exploit only triggers when the caller passes their own options object to `pool.run()`.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the worker pool. If the application passes attacker-controlled data as the `run()` task and also supplies a `run()` options object, the attacker can redirect execution to a malicious worker that exfiltrates or modifies that data, achieving remote code execution and/or data exfiltration.</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept</p>
<p>```js
// legitimate-worker.mjs
export default async (task) =&gt; ({ by: 'legitimate-worker', processed: task })</p>
<p>// malicious-worker.mjs
export default async (task) =&gt; ({ by: 'attacker', stolenRequestBody: task…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-85c8-ppgw-ccpr"/>
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