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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T23:16:48.117308+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-377606</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-377606</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T23:16:48.163241+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-377606</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-377606"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100849</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-100849</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T23:16:48.163278+00:00</updated>
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        <p>AzuraCast is a self-hosted web radio management suite. In AzuraCast before 0.23.8, the station webhook URL validation in AbstractConnector::getValidUrl() (backend/src/Webhook/Connector/AbstractConnector.php), used by the Generic and Discord webhook connectors, rejects only URLs whose host is a literal link-local IP address (169.254.0.0/16 or fe80::/10). Loopback addresses and RFC1918 private ranges are not rejected, and any non-literal-IP hostname causes the IP parsing call to throw, which skips the check entirely. A user holding only the station-scoped WebHooks permission can therefore configure a webhook pointing at an internal, loopback, or private-network target and cause the server to issue an outbound HTTP POST containing the station's Now Playing data, resulting in server-side request forgery. The PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test endpoint allows the same low-privileged user to trigger the request on demand. At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100849"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c94r-cgjw-f264</id>
    <title>GHSA-c94r-cgjw-f264</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T23:16:48.163318+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>AzuraCast is a self-hosted web radio management suite. In AzuraCast before 0.23.8, the station webhook URL validation in AbstractConnector::getValidUrl() (backend/src/Webhook/Connector/AbstractConnector.php), used by the Generic and Discord webhook connectors, rejects only URLs whose host is a literal link-local IP address (169.254.0.0/16 or fe80::/10). Loopback addresses and RFC1918 private ranges are not rejected, and any non-literal-IP hostname causes the IP parsing call to throw, which skips the check entirely. A user holding only the station-scoped WebHooks permission can therefore configure a webhook pointing at an internal, loopback, or private-network target and cause the server to issue an outbound HTTP POST containing the station's Now Playing data, resulting in server-side request forgery. The PUT /station/{id}/webhook/{id}/test endpoint allows the same low-privileged user to trigger the request on demand. At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c94r-cgjw-f264"/>
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