<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T08:04:38.453690+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263073</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-263073</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T08:04:38.500762+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-263073</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-263073"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67489</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-67489</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T08:04:38.500799+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>@vitejs/plugin-rs provides React Server Components (RSC) support for Vite. Versions 0.5.5 and below are vulnerable to arbitrary remote code execution on the development server through unsafe dynamic imports in server function APIs (loadServerAction, decodeReply, decodeAction) when integrated into RSC applications that expose server function endpoints. Attackers with network access to the development server can read/modify files, exfiltrate sensitive data (source code, environment variables, credentials), or pivot to other internal services. While this affects development servers only, the risk increases when using vite --host to expose the server on all network interfaces. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.6.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-67489"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j76j-5p5g-9wfr</id>
    <title>GHSA-j76j-5p5g-9wfr — @vitejs/plugin-rsc Remote Code Execution through unsafe dynamic imports in RSC server function APIs on development serv…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T08:04:38.500836+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @vitejs/plugin-rsc</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Arbitrary Remote Code Execution on development server via unsafe dynamic imports in `@vitejs/plugin-rsc` server function APIs (`loadServerAction`, `decodeReply`, `decodeAction`) when integrated into RSC applications that expose server function endpoints.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>Attackers with network access to the development server can execute arbitrary JavaScript code with Node.js privileges, allowing them to read/modify files, exfiltrate sensitive data (source code, environment variables, credentials), or pivot to other internal services. While this affects development servers only, the risk increases when using `vite --host` to expose the server on all network interfaces.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>In the example RSC application provided in Proof of Concept, the server handles server function call through API such as `loadServerAction`, `decodeReply`, `decodeAction` with http request's header and body as inputs:</p>
<p>https://github.com/vitejs/vite-plugin-react/blob/c8af971f57f12d0190d7fd8829a429f5e4112f60/packages/plugin-rsc/examples/starter/src/framework/entry.rsc.tsx#L42-L47</p>
<p>During development, these API internally relies on dynamic import to load server function module, which allows executing arbitrary module including data url module.</p>
<p>https://github.com/vitejs/vite-plugin-react/blob/c8af971f57f12d0190d7fd8829a429f5e4112f60/packages/plugin-rsc/src/rsc.tsx#L19-L24</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept</p>
<p>The example app is avialable in
- https://github.com/vitejs/vite-plugin-react/tree/main/packages/pl…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j76j-5p5g-9wfr"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
