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EUVD-2026-261691

2026-10-10T16:42:09.615017+00:00

EUVD-2026-261691

fkie_cve-2025-62609

2026-10-10T16:42:09.615062+00:00

MLX is an array framework for machine learning on Apple silicon. Prior to version 0.29.4, there is a segmentation fault in mlx::core::load_gguf() when loading malicious GGUF files. Untrusted pointer from external gguflib library is dereferenced without validation, causing application crash. This issue has been patched in version 0.29.4.

GHSA-j842-xgm4-wf88 — MLX has Wild Pointer Dereference in load_gguf()

2026-10-10T16:42:09.615098+00:00

Affected: PyPI: mlx

## Summary

Segmentation fault in `mlx::core::load_gguf()` when loading malicious GGUF files. Untrusted pointer from external gguflib library is dereferenced without validation, causing application crash.

Environment: - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS - Compiler: Clang 19.1.7

## Vulnerability

**Location**: `mlx/io/gguf.cpp` - Function `extract_tensor_data()` at lines 59-79 - Vulnerable memcpy at lines 64-67 - Called from `load_arrays()` at line 177

**The Bug**: ```cpp std::tuple extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) { std::optional equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor->type); if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) { allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor->bsize); memcpy( buffer.raw_ptr(), tensor->weights_data, // untrusted pointer from gguflib tensor->num_weights * equivalent_dtype.value().size()); return {buffer, equivalent_dtype.value()}; } // ... } ```

## Possible Fix

```cpp std::tuple extract_tensor_data(gguf_tensor* tensor) { std::optional equivalent_dtype = gguf_type_to_dtype(tensor->type); if (equivalent_dtype.has_value()) { // FIX: Validate pointer if (!tensor->weights_data) { throw std::runtime_error("[load_gguf] NULL tensor data pointer"); }

allocator::Buffer buffer = allocator::malloc(tensor->bsize); memcpy( buffer.raw_ptr(), tensor->weights_data, tensor->num_weights * equivalent_dtype…

PYSEC-2025-139

2026-10-10T16:42:09.615165+00:00

Affected: PyPI: mlx