https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-07T01:27:13.604412+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-260226 EUVD-2026-260226 2026-10-07T01:27:13.656241+00:00 EUVD-2026-260226 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-62596 fkie_cve-2025-62596 2026-10-07T01:27:13.656278+00:00

Youki is a container runtime written in Rust. In versions 0.5.6 and below, youki’s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, and when combined with path substitution during pathname resolution, can allow writes to unintended procfs locations. While resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.7.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vf95-55w6-qmrf GHSA-vf95-55w6-qmrf — youki container escape and denial of service due to arbitrary write gadgets and procfs write redirects 2026-10-07T01:27:13.656315+00:00

Affected: crates.io: youki

### Impact ###

youki’s apparmor handling performs insufficiently strict write-target validation, which—combined with path substitution during pathname resolution—can allow writes to unintended procfs locations.

**Weak write-target check** youki only verifies that the destination lies somewhere under procfs. As a result, a write intended for `/proc/self/attr/apparmor/exec` can succeed even if the path has been redirected to `/proc/sys/kernel/hostname`(which is also in procfs).

**Path substitution** While resolving a path component-by-component, a shared-mount race can substitute intermediate components and redirect the final target.

This is a different project, but the core logic is similar to the CVE in runc. Issues were identified in runc, and verification was also conducted in youki to confirm the problems. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm

### Credits ###

Thanks to Li Fubang (@lifubang from acmcoder.com, CIIC) and Tõnis Tiigi (@tonistiigi from Docker) for both independently discovering runc's original vulnerability, as well as Aleksa Sarai (@cyphar from SUSE) for the original research into this class of security issues and solutions.