feiskyer mcp-kubernetes-server through 0.1.11 does not consider chained commands in the implementation of --disable-write and --disable-delete, e.g., it allows a "kubectl version; kubectl delete pod" command because the first word (i.e., "version") is not a write or delete operation.

Affected: PyPI: mcp-kubernetes-server

`mcp-kubernetes-server` does not correctly enforce the `--disable-write` / `--disable-delete` protections when commands are chained. The server only inspects the first token to decide whether an operation is write/delete, which allows a read-like command to be followed by a write action using shell metacharacters (e.g., `kubectl version; kubectl delete pod <name>`). A remote attacker who can invoke the server may therefore bypass the intended write/delete restrictions and perform state-changing operations against the Kubernetes cluster.

**Affected versions:** through `0.1.11` (no patched release available as of now).

**Mitigations:** - Run with `--disable-kubectl` and/or `--disable-helm` to fully block those execution paths. - Put the server behind an allow-list proxy restricting allowed subcommands.

Affected: PyPI: mcp-kubernetes-server

`mcp-kubernetes-server` does not correctly enforce the `--disable-write` / `--disable-delete` protections when commands are chained. The server only inspects the first token to decide whether an operation is write/delete, which allows a read-like command to be followed by a write action using shell metacharacters (e.g., `kubectl version; kubectl delete pod <name>`). A remote attacker who can invoke the server may therefore bypass the intended write/delete restrictions and perform state-changing operations against the Kubernetes cluster.

**Affected versions:** through `0.1.11` (no patched release available as of now).

**Mitigations:** - Run with `--disable-kubectl` and/or `--disable-helm` to fully block those execution paths. - Put the server behind an allow-list proxy restricting allowed subcommands.