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  <updated>2026-10-07T19:43:46.287115+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-250489</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-250489</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T19:43:46.338625+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-250489</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-250489"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-57801</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-57801</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T19:43:46.338664+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S &lt; order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-57801"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-95v9-hv42-pwrj</id>
    <title>GHSA-95v9-hv42-pwrj — gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T19:43:46.338704+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/consensys/gnark</p>
<p>In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S &lt; order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.</p>
<p>### Exploitation</p>
<p>```go
package main</p>
<p>import (
	"crypto/rand"
	"fmt"
	"math/big"</p>
<p>"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc"
	mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc"
	eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa"</p>
<p>"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards"
	stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc"
	stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa"</p>
<p>te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards"
)</p>
<p>// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
	Msg frontend.Variable  `gnark:",public"`
	Pk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"`
	Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}</p>
<p>func (c *…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-95v9-hv42-pwrj"/>
  </entry>
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