Affected: Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use

gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered:

[ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei]

The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet.

Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 116 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mei: vsc: Fix fortify-panic caused by invalid counted_by() use gcc 15 honors the __counted_by(len) attribute on vsc_tp_packet.buf[] and the vsc-tp.c code is using this in a wrong way. len does not contain the available size in the buffer, it contains the actual packet length *without* the crc. So as soon as vsc_tp_xfer() tries to add the crc to buf[] the fortify-panic handler gets triggered: [ 80.842193] memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 [ 80.842243] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 272 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ... [ 80.843175] __fortify_panic+0x9/0xb [ 80.843186] vsc_tp_xfer.cold+0x67/0x67 [mei_vsc_hw] [ 80.843210] ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90 [ 80.843229] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7c/0x110 [ 80.843250] mei_vsc_hw_start+0x98/0x120 [mei_vsc] [ 80.843270] mei_reset+0x11d/0x420 [mei] The easiest fix would be to just drop the counted-by but with the exception of the ack buffer in vsc_tp_xfer_helper() which only contains enough room for the packet-header, all other uses of vsc_tp_packet always use a buffer of VSC_TP_MAX_XFER_SIZE bytes for the packet. Instead of just dropping the counted-by, split the vsc_tp_packet struct definition into a header and a full-packet definition and use a fixed size buf[] in the packet definition, this way fortify-source buffer overrun checking still works when enabled.