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  <updated>2026-10-07T00:28:11.822098+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-227009</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-227009</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T00:28:11.857371+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-227009</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-227009"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-31484</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2025-31484</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T00:28:11.857421+00:00</updated>
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        <p>conda-forge infrastructure holds common configurations and settings for key pieces of the conda-forge infrastructure.
Between 2025-02-10 and 2025-04-01, conda-forge infrastructure used the wrong token for Azure's cf-staging access. This bug meant that any feedstock maintainer could upload a package to the conda-forge channel, bypassing our feedstock-token + upload process. The security logs on anaconda.org were check for any packages that were not copied from the cf-staging to the conda-forge channel and none were found.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-31484"/>
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