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EUVD-2026-222193

2026-10-07T11:24:02.471913+00:00

EUVD-2026-222193

fkie_cve-2025-27794

2026-10-07T11:24:02.471955+00:00

Flarum is open-source forum software. A session hijacking vulnerability exists in versions prior to 1.8.10 when an attacker-controlled authoritative subdomain under a parent domain (e.g., `subdomain.host.com`) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (`.host.com`). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., `community.host.com`) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication. Key Constraints are that the attacker must control any subdomain under the parent domain (e.g., `evil.host.com` or `x.y.host.com`), and the parent domain must not be on the Public Suffix List. Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described. Version 1.8.10 contains a patch for the issue.

GHSA-hg9j-64wp-m9px — Flarum Vulnerable to Session Hijacking via Authoritative Subdomain Cookie Overwrite

2026-10-07T11:24:02.471996+00:00

Affected: Packagist: flarum/core, Packagist: flarum/framework

## **Summary** A session hijacking vulnerability exists when an attacker-controlled **authoritative subdomain** under a parent domain (e.g., `subdomain.host.com`) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (`.host.com`). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., `community.host.com`) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication.

**Key Constraints**: - Attacker must control **any subdomain** under the parent domain (e.g., `evil.host.com` or `x.y.host.com`). - Parent domain must **not** be on the [Public Suffix List](https://publicsuffix.org/).

Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described.

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## **Proof of Concept (Deno)** ```ts Deno.serve({ port: 8000, // default hostname: 'localhost', onListen: (o) => console.log(`Server started at http://${o.hostname}:${o.port}`, o), }, async (req) => (console.log(req), new Response( `You've been served! You came from ${req.headers.get('referer')}`, { //status: 302, // would redirect user to page they came from status: 200, headers: { 'set-cookie': 'session_cookie=mytoken; Domain=.deno.dev; Secure; HttpOnly', 'location': req.headers.get('referer') } } )) ); ```

### **Attack Flow** 1. **Attacker Setup**: Hosts serve…