File Upload vulnerability in ChestnutCMS through 1.5.0. Based on the code analysis, it was determined that the /api/member/avatar API endpoint receives a base64 string as input. This string is then passed to the memberService.uploadAvatarByBase64 method for processing. Within the service, the base64-encoded image is parsed. For example, given a string like:  the content after the comma is extracted and decoded using Base64.getDecoder().decode(). The substring from the 11th character up to the first occurrence of a semicolon (;) is assigned to the suffix variable (representing the file extension). The decoded content is then written to a file. However, the file extension is not validated, and since this functionality is exposed to the frontend, it poses significant security risks.

File Upload vulnerability in ChestnutCMS through 1.5.0. Based on the code analysis, it was determined that the /api/member/avatar API endpoint receives a base64 string as input. This string is then passed to the memberService.uploadAvatarByBase64 method for processing. Within the service, the base64-encoded image is parsed. For example, given a string like:  the content after the comma is extracted and decoded using Base64.getDecoder().decode(). The substring from the 11th character up to the first occurrence of a semicolon (;) is assigned to the suffix variable (representing the file extension). The decoded content is then written to a file. However, the file extension is not validated, and since this functionality is exposed to the frontend, it poses significant security risks.