rPGP is a pure Rust implementation of OpenPGP. Prior to 0.14.1, rPGP allows attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in rpgp by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

Affected: crates.io: pgp

During a security audit, [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) discovered two vulnerabilities which allow attackers to trigger resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in `rpgp` by providing crafted messages. This affects general message parsing and decryption with symmetric keys.

### Impact Affected `rpgp` versions do not correctly set upper limits on the total reserved amount of memory when parsing long sequences of partial OpenPGP packets, which can grow to to several GiB in size. Additionally, up to 4GiB of memory is reserved for OpenPGP packets of fixed size with large length fields, even if less data is received. Depending on existing message size restrictions and available system resources, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash the `rpgp` process or cause other system instability through memory resource exhaustion when parsing crafted messages.

Affected `rpgp` versions are susceptible to excessive memory allocation with values of up to 2TiB or long processing times for some decryption operations which involve the [Argon2 function](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9580.html#name-argon2). An attacker can provide a valid `Symmetric Key Encrypted Session Key` packet (SKESK) which uses `Argon2` for String-to-Key hashing with parameters that are excessive, but within specification limits of the RFC9580 OpenPGP standard. Since `rpgp` did not further restrict the Argon2 parameters, this can cause out-of-memory conditions and crash…