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  <updated>2026-10-05T17:19:02.905327+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-196594</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-196594</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T17:19:02.951556+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-196594</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-196594"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-48930</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2024-48930</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T17:19:02.951594+00:00</updated>
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        <p>secp256k1-node is a Node.js binding for an Optimized C library for EC operations on curve secp256k1. In `elliptic`-based version, `loadUncompressedPublicKey` has a check that the public key is on the curve. Prior to versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1, however, `loadCompressedPublicKey` is missing that check. That allows the attacker to use public keys on low-cardinality curves to extract enough information to fully restore the private key from as little as 11 ECDH sessions, and very cheaply on compute power. Other operations on public keys are also affected, including e.g. `publicKeyVerify()` incorrectly returning `true` on those invalid keys, and e.g. `publicKeyTweakMul()` also returning predictable outcomes allowing to restore the tweak. Versions 5.0.1, 4.0.4, and 3.8.1 contain a fix for the issue.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-48930"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-584q-6j8j-r5pm</id>
    <title>GHSA-584q-6j8j-r5pm — secp256k1-node allows private key extraction over ECDH</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T17:19:02.951630+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: secp256k1</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>In `elliptic`-based version, `loadUncompressedPublicKey` has a check that the public key is on the curve: https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/blob/6d3474b81d073cc9c8cc8cfadb580c84f8df5248/lib/elliptic.js#L37-L39</p>
<p>`loadCompressedPublicKey` is, however, missing that check: https://github.com/cryptocoinjs/secp256k1-node/blob/6d3474b81d073cc9c8cc8cfadb580c84f8df5248/lib/elliptic.js#L17-L19</p>
<p>That allows the attacker to use public keys on low-cardinality curves to extract enough information to fully restore the private key from as little as 11 ECDH sessions, and very cheaply on compute power</p>
<p>Other operations on public keys are also affected, including e.g. `publicKeyVerify()` incorrectly returning `true` on those invalid keys, and e.g. `publicKeyTweakMul()` also returning predictable outcomes allowing to restore the tweak</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The curve equation is `Y^2 = X^3 + 7`, and it restores `Y` from `X` in `loadCompressedPublicKey`, using `Y = sqrt(X^3 + 7)`, but when there are no valid `Y` values satisfying `Y^2 = X^3 + 7` for a given `X`, the same code calculates a solution for `-Y^2 = X^3 + 7`, and that solution also satisfies some other equation `Y^2 = X^3 + D`, where `D` is not equal to 7 and might be on a curve with factorizable cardinality, so `(X,Y)` might be a low-order point on that curve, lowering the number of possible ECDH output values to bruteforcable</p>
<p>Those output values correspond to remainders which can be then combined with Chinese remai…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-584q-6j8j-r5pm"/>
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