Collabora Online is a collaborative online office suite based on LibreOffice technology. Any deployment of voilà dashboard allow local file inclusion. Any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voilà dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server. Whether this still requires authentication depends on how voilà is deployed. This issue has been patched in 0.2.17, 0.3.8, 0.4.4 and 0.5.6.

Affected: PyPI: voila

### Impact

Any deployment of voilà dashboard allow local file inclusion, that is to say any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voilà dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server.

Whether this still requires authentication depends on how voilà is deployed.

### Patches

This is patched in 0.2.17+, 0.3.8+, 0.4.4+, 0.5.6+

### Workarounds

None.

### References

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

### Original report

I have found a local file inclusion vulnerability in one of your subprojects, voila (https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila).

The vulnerability exists in the "/static" Route, and can be exploited by simply making a request such as this:

``` $ curl localhost:8866/static/etc/passwd ```

...or by using a webbrowser to download the file.

I dug into the source code, and I think the offending line is here: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/blob/8419cc7d79c0bb1dabfbd9ec49cb957740609d4d/voila/app.py#L664 `"static_path"` gets set to `"/"`, irrespective of the actual `"--static"` cli option. Because of that, the `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler` gets initialized with `path="/"`. Then, `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get` calls `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get_absolute_path` with `root="/"` and `path="[USER SUPPLIED PATH]"`, which leads to local file inclusion. An attacker can request any file on the system they want (that the user running voila has access to).

I suspect this was an…

Affected: PyPI: voila

### Impact

Any deployment of voilà dashboard allow local file inclusion, that is to say any file on a filesystem that is readable by the user that runs the voilà dashboard server can be downloaded by someone with network access to the server.

Whether this still requires authentication depends on how voilà is deployed.

### Patches

This is patched in 0.2.17+, 0.3.8+, 0.4.4+, 0.5.6+

### Workarounds

None.

### References

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

### Original report

I have found a local file inclusion vulnerability in one of your subprojects, voila (https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila).

The vulnerability exists in the "/static" Route, and can be exploited by simply making a request such as this:

``` $ curl localhost:8866/static/etc/passwd ```

...or by using a webbrowser to download the file.

I dug into the source code, and I think the offending line is here: https://github.com/voila-dashboards/voila/blob/8419cc7d79c0bb1dabfbd9ec49cb957740609d4d/voila/app.py#L664 `"static_path"` gets set to `"/"`, irrespective of the actual `"--static"` cli option. Because of that, the `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler` gets initialized with `path="/"`. Then, `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get` calls `tornado.web.StaticFileHandler.get_absolute_path` with `root="/"` and `path="[USER SUPPLIED PATH]"`, which leads to local file inclusion. An attacker can request any file on the system they want (that the user running voila has access to).

I suspect this was an…