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  <updated>2026-10-20T03:33:53.580469+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-4482</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-4482</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:33:53.583331+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-4482</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-4482"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-28181</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2024-28181</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:33:53.583363+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>turbo_boost-commands is a set of commands to help you build robust reactive applications with Rails &amp; Hotwire. TurboBoost Commands has existing protections in place to guarantee that only public methods on Command classes can be invoked; however, the existing checks aren't as robust as they should be. It's possible for a sophisticated attacker to invoke more methods than should be permitted depending on the the strictness of authorization checks that individual applications enforce. Being able to call some of these methods can have security implications. Commands verify that the class must be a `Command` and that the method requested is defined as a public method; however, this isn't robust enough to guard against all unwanted code execution. The library should more strictly enforce which methods are considered safe before allowing them to be executed. This issue has been addressed in versions 0.1.3, and 0.2.2. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should see the repository GHSA for workaround advice.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2024-28181"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mp76-7w5v-pr75</id>
    <title>GHSA-mp76-7w5v-pr75 — TurboBoost Commands vulnerable to arbitrary method invocation</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:33:53.583400+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: turbo_boost-commands, npm: @turbo-boost/commands</p>
<p>### Impact
TurboBoost Commands has existing protections in place to guarantee that only public methods on Command classes can be invoked; however, the existing checks aren't as robust as they should be. It's possible for a sophisticated attacker to invoke more methods than should be permitted depending on the the strictness of authorization checks that individual applications enforce. Being able to call some of these methods can have security implications.</p>
<p>#### Details
Commands verify that the class must be a `Command` and that the method requested is defined as a public method; however, this isn't robust enough to guard against all unwanted code execution. The library should more strictly enforce which methods are considered safe before allowing them to be executed.</p>
<p>### Patches
Patched in the following versions.
- 0.1.3
  - [NPM Package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@turbo-boost/commands/v/0.1.3)
  - [Ruby GEM](https://rubygems.org/gems/turbo_boost-commands/versions/0.1.3)
- 0.2.2
  - [NPM Package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@turbo-boost/commands/v/0.2.2)
  - [Ruby GEM](https://rubygems.org/gems/turbo_boost-commands/versions/0.2.2)</p>
<p>### Workarounds
You can add this guard to mitigate the issue if running an unpatched version of the library.</p>
<p>```ruby
class ApplicationCommand &lt; TurboBoost::Commands::Command
  before_command do
    method_name = params[:name].include?("#") ? params[:name].split("#").last : :perform
    ancestors = self.class.ancestors[0..self.class.anc…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mp76-7w5v-pr75"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-28181</id>
    <title>gsd-2024-28181</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:33:53.583461+00:00</updated>
    <content>gsd-2024-28181</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2024-28181"/>
  </entry>
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