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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.422322+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2023-04626</id>
    <title>bdu:2023-04626</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.426947+00:00</updated>
    <content>bdu:2023-04626</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2023-04626"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-191952</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-191952</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.426979+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-191952</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-191952"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-39523</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2023-39523</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.426993+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>ScanCode.io is a server to script and automate software composition analysis with ScanPipe pipelines. Prior to version 32.5.1, the software has a possible command injection vulnerability in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the `docker_reference` parameter.</p>
<p>In the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image` the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`.  However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections. A malicious user who is able to create or add inputs to a project can inject commands. Although the command injections are blind and the user will not receive direct feedback without logs, it is still possible to cause damage to the server/container. The vulnerability appears for example if a malicious user adds a semicolon after the input of `docker://;`, it would allow appending malicious commands.</p>
<p>Version 32.5.1 contains a patch for this issue. The `docker_reference` input should be sanitized to avoid command injections and, as a workaround, one may avoid creating commands with user controlled input directly.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2023-39523"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2ggp-cmvm-f62f</id>
    <title>GHSA-2ggp-cmvm-f62f — ScanCode.io command injection in docker image fetch process</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.427032+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: scancodeio</p>
<p>## Command Injection in docker fetch process</p>
<p>### Summary
A possible command injection in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the docker_reference parameter.</p>
<p>### Details
In the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image`[1] the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`. 
```python
def fetch_docker_image(docker_reference, to=None):
    """
    code snipped ....
    """
    platform_args = []
    platform = get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference) # User controlled `docker_reference` passed
   """
   code snipped...
   """
```</p>
<p>However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections.</p>
<p>```python
def get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference):
    """
    Return a platform mapping of a docker reference.
    If there are more than one, return the first one by default.
    """
    skopeo_executable = _get_skopeo_location()
    """
    Constructing a shell command with user controlled variable `docker_reference`
    """
    cmd = (
        f"{skopeo_executable} inspect --insecure-policy --raw --no-creds "
        f"{docker_reference}"
    )</p>
<p>logger.info(f"Fetching image os/arch data: {cmd}")
    exitcode, output = pipes.run_c…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2ggp-cmvm-f62f"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-39523</id>
    <title>gsd-2023-39523</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.427096+00:00</updated>
    <content>gsd-2023-39523</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/gsd-2023-39523"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1904</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-1904 — ScanCode.io command injection in docker image fetch process</title>
    <updated>2026-10-19T00:49:42.427110+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: scancodeio</p>
<p>## Command Injection in docker fetch process</p>
<p>### Summary
A possible command injection in the docker fetch process as it allows to append malicious commands in the docker_reference parameter.</p>
<p>### Details
In the function `scanpipe/pipes/fetch.py:fetch_docker_image`[1] the parameter `docker_reference` is user controllable. The `docker_reference` variable is then passed to the vulnerable function `get_docker_image_platform`. 
```python
def fetch_docker_image(docker_reference, to=None):
    """
    code snipped ....
    """
    platform_args = []
    platform = get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference) # User controlled `docker_reference` passed
   """
   code snipped...
   """
```</p>
<p>However, the `get_docker_image_plaform` function constructs a shell command with the passed `docker_reference`. The `pipes.run_command` then executes the shell command without any prior sanitization, making the function vulnerable to command injections.</p>
<p>```python
def get_docker_image_platform(docker_reference):
    """
    Return a platform mapping of a docker reference.
    If there are more than one, return the first one by default.
    """
    skopeo_executable = _get_skopeo_location()
    """
    Constructing a shell command with user controlled variable `docker_reference`
    """
    cmd = (
        f"{skopeo_executable} inspect --insecure-policy --raw --no-creds "
        f"{docker_reference}"
    )</p>
<p>logger.info(f"Fetching image os/arch data: {cmd}")
    exitcode, output = pipes.run_c…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1904"/>
  </entry>
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