Affected: Bitnami: cosign

Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The `signature` in the `signedEntryTimestamp` provided by Rekor is now compared to the `signature` that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround.

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: cosign

Package cosign version 1.5.2-r0 fixes 1 vulnerabilities: CVE-2022-23649

Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The `signature` in the `signedEntryTimestamp` provided by Rekor is now compared to the `signature` that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround.

Affected: Go: github.com/sigstore/cosign

### Impact

Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio.

#### Signing with a keypair

<details>

To reproduce this vulnerability, create a keypair and sign an image. Don't store the signature in Rekor:

``` $ cosign generate-key-pair $ cosign sign --key cosign.key IMAGE ```

If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. To accomplish this, the attacker needs to:

1. Pull the signature image 2. Annotate the signature image with any valid Rekor bundle under the `dev.sigstore.cosign/bundle` annotation 3. Push the signature image back to OCI

Verification then prints out the following:

``` $ cosign verify [--key] [IMAGE]

Verification for [IMAGE] -- The following checks were performed on each of these signatures: - The cosign claims were validated - Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline - The signatures were verified against the specified public key - Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.

[…] ```

The claim that `Existence of the claims in the transparency log was verified offline` is inaccurate since an entry for this image doesn't exist in the log. The claim…

cosign-1.5.2-1.1 on GA media