A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V1 family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V2.0.2), SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V2 family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V2.0.2). Affected controllers are vulnerable to capture-replay in the communication with the engineering software. This could allow an on-path attacker between the engineering software and the controller to execute any previously recorded commands at a later time (e.g. set the controller to STOP), regardless whether or not the controller had a password configured.

A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V1 family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V2.0.2), SIMATIC S7-1200 CPU V2 family (incl. SIPLUS variants) (All versions < V2.0.2). Affected controllers are vulnerable to capture-replay in the communication with the engineering software. This could allow an on-path attacker between the engineering software and the controller to execute any previously recorded commands at a later time (e.g. set the controller to STOP), regardless whether or not the controller had a password configured.

The web server interface of affected devices improperly processes incoming malformed HTTP traffic at high rate. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to force the device entering the stop/defect state, thus creating a denial of service condition. Affected controllers are vulnerable to capture-replay in the communication with the engineering software. This could allow an on-path attacker between the engineering software and the controller to execute any previously recorded commands at a later time (e.g. set the controller to STOP), regardless whether or not the controller had a password configured.

The web server interface of affected devices improperly processes incoming malformed HTTP traffic at high rate. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to force the device entering the stop/defect state, thus creating a denial of service condition. Affected controllers are vulnerable to capture-replay in the communication with the engineering software. This could allow an on-path attacker between the engineering software and the controller to execute any previously recorded commands at a later time (e.g. set the controller to STOP), regardless whether or not the controller had a password configured.