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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-05T10:27:15.205689+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-25285</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-25285 — @octokit/endpoint has a Regular Expression in parse that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T10:27:15.656755+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> octokit endpoint.js</p>
<p>@octokit/endpoint turns REST API endpoints into generic request options. Starting in version 4.1.0 and prior to version 10.1.3, by crafting specific `options` parameters, the `endpoint.parse(options)` call can be triggered, leading to a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) attack. This causes the program to hang and results in high CPU utilization. The issue occurs in the `parse` function within the `parse.ts` file of the npm package `@octokit/endpoint`. Version 10.1.3 contains a patch for the issue.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-25285"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-23c5-xmqv-rm74</id>
    <title>GHSA-23c5-xmqv-rm74 — minimatch ReDoS: nested *() extglobs generate catastrophically backtracking regular expressions</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T10:27:15.656829+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: minimatch</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Nested `*()` extglobs produce regexps with nested unbounded quantifiers (e.g. `(?:(?:a|b)*)*`), which exhibit catastrophic backtracking in V8. With a 12-byte pattern `*(*(*(a|b)))` and an 18-byte non-matching input, `minimatch()` stalls for over 7 seconds. Adding a single nesting level or a few input characters pushes this to minutes. This is the most severe finding: it is triggered by the default `minimatch()` API with no special options, and the minimum viable pattern is only 12 bytes. The same issue affects `+()` extglobs equally.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The root cause is in `AST.toRegExpSource()` at [`src/ast.ts#L598`](https://github.com/isaacs/minimatch/blob/v10.2.2/src/ast.ts#L598). For the `*` extglob type, the close token emitted is `)*` or `)?`, wrapping the recursive body in `(?:...)*`. When extglobs are nested, each level adds another `*` quantifier around the previous group:</p>
<p>```typescript
: this.type === '*' &amp;&amp; bodyDotAllowed ? `)?`
: `)${this.type}`
```</p>
<p>This produces the following regexps:</p>
<p>| Pattern              | Generated regex                          |
|----------------------|------------------------------------------|
| `*(a\|b)`            | `/^(?:a\|b)*$/`                          |
| `*(*(a\|b))`         | `/^(?:(?:a\|b)*)*$/`                     |
| `*(*(*(a\|b)))`      | `/^(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*$/`               |
| `*(*(*(*(a\|b))))` | `/^(?:(?:(?:(?:a\|b)*)*)*)*$/`          |</p>
<p>These are textbook nested-quantifier patterns. Against an input o…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-23c5-xmqv-rm74"/>
  </entry>
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