Affected: Go standard library syscall, Go standard library os

os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|O_EXCL) behaved differently on Unix and Windows systems when the target path was a dangling symlink. On Unix systems, OpenFile with O_CREATE and O_EXCL flags never follows symlinks. On Windows, when the target path was a symlink to a nonexistent location, OpenFile would create a file in that location. OpenFile now always returns an error when the O_CREATE and O_EXCL flags are both set and the target path is a symlink.

Affected: Go: github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3

### Summary An attacker who has permissions to read logs from pods in a namespace with Argo Workflow can read `workflow-controller` logs and get credentials to the artifact repository.

### Details An attacker, by reading the logs of the workflow controller pod, can access the artifact repository, and steal, delete or modify the data that resides there. The `workflow-controller` logs show the credentials in plaintext.

<img width="1366" alt="screen" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5642b2be-edcf-4050-bf47-747d05352698" />

### Impact An attacker with access to pod logs in the `argo` namespace can extract plaintext credentials from the `workflow-controller` logs and gain access to the artifact repository. This can lead to: - Data exfiltration – theft of sensitive or proprietary artifacts - Data tampering – modification of workflows or artifacts - Data destruction – deletion of stored artifacts, leading to potential loss of critical data or pipeline failure