Affected: OpenVPN

Improper validation of source IP addresses in OpenVPN version 2.6.0 through 2.6.15 and 2.7_alpha1 through 2.7_rc1 allows an attacker to open a session from a different IP address which did not initiate the connection resulting in a denial of service for the originating client

Affected: PyPI: jaraco.context

### Summary There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed. The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`. Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.

The code can be found: - https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91 - https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)

This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.

The lengthy answer is:

The vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball). The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering…