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  <updated>2026-11-18T07:38:35.487177+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-52881</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-52881 — runc: LSM labels can be bypassed with malicious config using dummy procfs files</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T07:38:35.489109+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> opencontainers runc</p>
<p>runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7, 1.3.2 and 1.4.0-rc.2, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (we have also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. While similar, the mitigation applied for the related CVE, CVE-2019-19921, was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when LSM labels are written they are actually procfs files. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-52881"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf</id>
    <title>GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf — gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T07:38:35.489187+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: google.golang.org/grpc</p>
<p>Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:</p>
<p>- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields.
- Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
- Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.</p>
<p>### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p>
<p>#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` &amp; `RequestedServerName` matchers</p>
<p>- Affected Component: xDS RBAC 
- Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
- If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.</p>
<p>As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf"/>
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