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  <updated>2026-10-04T16:19:30.492746+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-66564</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-66564 — Sigstore Timestamp Authority allocates excessive memory during request parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T16:19:30.674099+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> sigstore timestamp-authority</p>
<p>Sigstore Timestamp Authority is a service for issuing RFC 3161 timestamps. Prior to 2.0.3, Function api.ParseJSONRequest currently splits (via a call to strings.Split) an optionally-provided OID (which is untrusted data) on periods. Similarly, function api.getContentType splits the Content-Type header (which is also untrusted data) on an application string. As a result, in the face of a malicious request with either an excessively long OID in the payload containing many period characters or a malformed Content-Type header, a call to api.ParseJSONRequest or api.getContentType incurs allocations of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function's argument). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-66564"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx</id>
    <title>GHSA-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx — chi Has an IP Spoofing Vulnerability in `middleware.RealIP`</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T16:19:30.674166+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware</p>
<p>## Summary
The `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header.</p>
<p>## Details
In `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value:</p>
<p>```go
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
    // ...
    } else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
        ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",")
    }
    // ...
}
```</p>
<p>Standard practice for `X-Forwarded-For` is that each proxy appends the client's IP to the end of the list. However, since the client can also provide this header, the leftmost values are untrusted. A client can send a header like `X-Forwarded-For: &lt;spoofed_ip&gt;, &lt;actual_proxy_ip&gt;`, and `go-chi/chi` will treat `&lt;spoofed_ip&gt;` as the source of the request.</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept (PoC)
The following code demonstrates how an attacker can bypass an IP-based restriction.</p>
<p>```go
package main</p>
<p>import (
        "fmt"
        "net/http"
        "net/http/httptest"</p>
<p>"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
        "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)</p>
<p>func main() {
        r := chi.NewRouter()</p>
<p>// Enable the vulnerable RealIP middleware
        r.Use(middleware.RealIP)</p>
<p>// An endpoint that should be restricted to a specific administrat…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fxj-6jh8-hvhx"/>
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