Affected: Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Jetty, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.4.0, Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.0, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1 for RHEL 8, Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 8.1 for RHEL 9, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.12, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.13, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.14, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 4.15 and 28 more

In Eclipse Jetty, versions 12.0.0-12.0.31 and 12.1.0-12.0.5, class GzipHandler exposes a vulnerability when a compressed HTTP request, with Content-Encoding: gzip, is processed and the corresponding response is not compressed.

This happens because the JDK Inflater is allocated for decompressing the request, but it is not released because the release mechanism is tied to the compressed response. In this case, since the response is not compressed, the release mechanism does not trigger, causing the leak.

Affected: Maven: tools.jackson.core:jackson-core, Maven: com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core

### Summary The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in `jackson-core` bypasses the `maxNumberLength` constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in `StreamReadConstraints`. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

### Details The root cause is that the async parsing path in `NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase` (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

- The number parsing methods (e.g., `_finishNumberIntegralPart`) accumulate digits into the `TextBuffer` without any length checks. - After parsing, they call `_valueComplete()`, which finalizes the token but does **not** call `resetInt()` or `resetFloat()`. - The `resetInt()`/`resetFloat()` methods in `ParserBase` are where the `validateIntegerLength()` and `validateFPLength()` checks are performed. - Because this validation step is skipped, the `maxNumberLength` constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

### PoC The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

```java package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org…