<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-07T16:24:29.325918+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-45337</id>
    <title>CVE-2024-45337 — Misuse of connection.serverAuthenticate may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T16:24:29.331899+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> golang.org/x/crypto/ssh</p>
<p>Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-45337"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c6gw-w398-hv78</id>
    <title>GHSA-c6gw-w398-hv78 — DoS in go-jose Parsing</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T16:24:29.331974+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4, Go: github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3, Go: github.com/go-jose/go-jose</p>
<p>### Impact
When parsing compact JWS or JWE input, go-jose could use excessive memory. The code used strings.Split(token, ".") to split JWT tokens, which is vulnerable to excessive memory consumption when processing maliciously crafted tokens with a large number of '.' characters.  An attacker could exploit this by sending numerous malformed tokens, leading to memory exhaustion and a Denial of Service.</p>
<p>### Patches
Version 4.0.5 fixes this issue</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Applications could pre-validate payloads passed to go-jose do not contain an excessive number of '.' characters.</p>
<p>### References
This is the same sort of issue as in the golang.org/x/oauth2/jws package as CVE-2025-22868 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/71490.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-c6gw-w398-hv78"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
