Affected: grpc-go, Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Extended Lifecycle Support, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.2 Update Services for SAP Solutions, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 Extended Update Support, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.4 Update Services for SAP Solutions and 158 more

gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass resulting from improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present. This affects gRPC-Go servers that use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`; AND that have a security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule). The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server. The fix in version 1.79.3 ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers w…

Affected: Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v5, Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v6

### Impact `go-git` may leak HTTP authentication credentials when following redirects during smart-HTTP clone and fetch operations.

If a remote repository responds to the initial `/info/refs` request with a redirect to a different host, go-git updates the session endpoint to the redirected location and reuses the original authentication for subsequent requests. This can result in the credentials (e.g. Authorization headers) being sent to an unintended host.

An attacker controlling or influencing the redirect target can capture these credentials and potentially reuse them to access the victim’s repositories or other resources, depending on the scope of the credential.

**Clients using `go-git` exclusively with trusted remotes (for example, GitHub or GitLab), and over a secure HTTPS connection, are not affected by this issue.** The risk arises when interacting with untrusted or misconfigured Git servers, or when using unsecured HTTP connections, which is not recommended. Such configurations also expose clients to a broader class of security risks beyond this issue, including credential interception and tampering of repository data.

### Patches Users should upgrade to `v5.18.0`, or `v6.0.0-alpha.2`, in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Versions prior to v5 are likely to be affected, users are recommended to upgrade to a supported `go-git` version.

The patched versions add support for configuring [followRedirects](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-config#Documentation/git-con…