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  <updated>2026-10-09T22:20:02.315753+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-98232</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-98232 — scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T22:20:02.330651+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable()</p>
<p>scsi_cdl_enable() uses length fields returned by MODE SENSE to locate
the ATA feature mode page in a 64-byte stack buffer. A target can report
a total length shorter than its mode header and block descriptors. The
unsigned subtraction used for the MODE SELECT length can wrap, and the
separately computed buf_data can point beyond buf.</p>
<p>During automatic scan, enable is false, so the read-modify-write of
buf_data[4] can clear the low two bits of a target-selected
out-of-bounds stack byte. scsi_mode_select() can then copy up to 64
bytes from outside the buffer into the outgoing MODE SELECT payload,
disclosing stack contents to the target.</p>
<p>This is reachable while scanning a USB storage device that identifies as
an ATA device and advertises CDL support. No filesystem mount or
userspace access to the block device is required.</p>
<p>On upstream commit cee9395acd80 ("Linux 7.3-rc1"), a build-specific,
one-vCPU QEMU/Raw Gadget proof using QEMU-only multi-UDC allocator
sampling executed a fixed proof command inside the guest and created a
UID-0-owned marker during automatic enumeration, with KASLR and NX
enabled.</p>
<p>The issue was independently found during security research at Drivesec
S.r.l.</p>
<p>Cap the available length to the buffer size. Validate and consume the
mode header and block descriptor lengths before using the page, and
require the five bytes needed to a…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-98232"/>
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