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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T04:35:19.338391+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59733</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59733 — rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overw…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T04:35:19.340228+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> rclone</p>
<p>Rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.74.4, rclone serve restic --private-repos enforces authorization using the routed user path segment while building the backend object key from the raw uncleaned URL path, allowing an authenticated user to include .. in a request such as //..//config and read, overwrite, or delete another user's private repository on backends that clean path components. This issue is fixed in version 1.74.4.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59733"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqj9-69pf-6pjg</id>
    <title>GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg — rclone `serve restic --private-repos` authorization bypass: `..` in the URL path lets an authenticated user read, overw…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T04:35:19.340283+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/rclone/rclone</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`rclone serve restic --private-repos` exists to let one rclone instance host many users' restic backup repositories behind HTTP Basic auth while keeping each user confined to a path prefix of `/&lt;username&gt;/`. The documentation states the flag "can be used to limit users to repositories starting with a path of `/&lt;username&gt;/`", and the shipped test `TestResticPrivateRepositories` asserts that user `test` may reach `/test/config` but is `403`-blocked from `/other_user/config`. This isolation is the entire security purpose of the flag.</p>
<p>The isolation is enforced by two independent chi middlewares that derive the username and the backend object path from two *different* sources, and the path source is never canonicalized. `checkPrivate` authorizes the request by comparing the routed `{userID}` path segment against the authenticated user, while `WithRemote` builds the backend object key from the raw, un-cleaned URL path. A request such as `GET /&lt;me&gt;/../&lt;victim&gt;/config` keeps the first path segment equal to the attacker's own username (so `checkPrivate` returns the request as authorized) yet hands the backend the literal remote `me/../victim/config`. On any backend that resolves object paths with POSIX `path.Join`/`path.Clean` semantics — which includes the bundled `memory` backend used in the PoC below, and the widely deployed `sftp` and `ftp` backends — that `..` segment collapses, and the operation is performed against the victim's object.</p>
<p>Because the same un-cleaned…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fqj9-69pf-6pjg"/>
  </entry>
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