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  <updated>2026-10-08T19:39:04.260895+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-38348</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-38348 — wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T19:39:04.282800+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>wifi: p54: prevent buffer-overflow in p54_rx_eeprom_readback()</p>
<p>Robert Morris reported:</p>
<p>|If a malicious USB device pretends to be an Intersil p54 wifi
|interface and generates an eeprom_readback message with a large
|eeprom-&gt;v1.len, p54_rx_eeprom_readback() will copy data from the
|message beyond the end of priv-&gt;eeprom.
|
|static void p54_rx_eeprom_readback(struct p54_common *priv,
|                                   struct sk_buff *skb)
|{
|        struct p54_hdr *hdr = (struct p54_hdr *) skb-&gt;data;
|        struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *eeprom = (struct p54_eeprom_lm86 *) hdr-&gt;data;
|
|        if (priv-&gt;fw_var &gt;= 0x509) {
|                memcpy(priv-&gt;eeprom, eeprom-&gt;v2.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&gt;v2.len));
|        } else {
|                memcpy(priv-&gt;eeprom, eeprom-&gt;v1.data,
|                       le16_to_cpu(eeprom-&gt;v1.len));
|        }
| [...]</p>
<p>The eeprom-&gt;v{1,2}.len is set by the driver in p54_download_eeprom().
The device is supposed to provide the same length back to the driver.
But yes, it's possible (like shown in the report) to alter the value
to something that causes a crash/panic due to overrun.</p>
<p>This patch addresses the issue by adding the size to the common device
context, so p54_rx_eeprom_readback no longer relies on possibly tampered
values... That said, it also checks if the "firmware" altered the value
and no longer copies them.</p>
<p>The one, small saving grace is: Befor…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2025-38348"/>
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