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  <updated>2026-10-05T21:43:06.206230+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-42096</id>
    <title>CVE-2024-42096 — x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T21:43:06.208325+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP - GNU/Linux subsystem, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP, Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()</p>
<p>The 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which
isn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends
up making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily
valid.</p>
<p>Basically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the
caller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept,
it's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious
profiling is done using timers anyway these days.</p>
<p>And the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the
simplest of cases.  We've lost the comment at some point (I think when
the 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say:</p>
<p>Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy
	of eflags from PUSHF.</p>
<p>which explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the
stack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check
if they might be eflags or the return pc:</p>
<p>Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses</p>
<p>but that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock
debugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack
frame.</p>
<p>It causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and
others [2].</p>
<p>With no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code.</p>
<p>Just for historical interest, here's some…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2024-42096"/>
  </entry>
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