<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-15T09:50:00.940896+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44556</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-44556 — Open WebUI: responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T09:50:00.942586+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> open-webui</p>
<p>Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user. This allows any authenticated user to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44556"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2734</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2734 — Open WebUI's responses passthrough endpoint lacks access control authorization</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T09:50:00.942638+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user.</p>
<p>This allows any authenticated user — regardless of role or group assignment — to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>As per OWASP TOP 10 LLM:</p>
<p>- **Model Denial of Service (OWASP LLM04):** An unauthorized user can submit resource-intensive requests to expensive models (e.g., o1-pro, GPT-4o) that were explicitly restricted by the administrator. In shared deployments, this can exhaust API budgets or rate limits, causing total service disruption for all legitimate users.</p>
<p>- **Model Theft (OWASP LLM10):** If the instance proxies access to fine-tuned or self-hosted models, unauthorized users can freely interact with them, enabling capability extraction or model distillation without authorization.</p>
<p>- **Access Policy Bypass:** Administrators lose the ability to enforce cost-tier restrictions, team-based model assignments, or compliance boundaries through the existing access control system.</p>
<p>The endpoint is a raw passthrough proxy and does not resol…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2734"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
