<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-18T03:16:14.131593+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0549</id>
    <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0549 — NSEC3 NODATA at a zone apex accepted without an NSEC3 record matching the query name (hickory-proto)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T03:16:14.133266+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: hickory-proto</p>
<p>In hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.26.0-alpha.1, NSEC3 NODATA validation returned a secure result for a query at the zone apex even when no NSEC3 record in the response matched the hash of the query name, which RFC 5155 section 8.5 requires. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could replay any genuine signed NSEC3 record from the zone with the zone's signed SOA record and get a denial of any record type at the apex accepted as secure.</p>
<p>From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in hickory-proto 0.25 or 0.26.0-alpha.1 (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0549"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
