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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.476886+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98976</id>
    <title>Withdrawn: BELL-CVE-2026-98976 — CVE-2026-98976 does not affect BellSoft software</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482678+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>
          <strong>Withdrawn by the publisher.</strong>
        </p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2026-98976"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392021</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-392021</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482712+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-392021</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392021"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98976</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-98976</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482727+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath</p>
<p>attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.</p>
<p>Consider two mount namespaces:</p>
<p>(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is
    locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.</p>
<p>Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.</p>
<p>Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:</p>
<p>Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */</p>
<p>So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98976"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38fm-jc3c-v2pm</id>
    <title>GHSA-38fm-jc3c-v2pm</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482778+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath</p>
<p>attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.</p>
<p>Consider two mount namespaces:</p>
<p>(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
    propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is
    locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.</p>
<p>Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.</p>
<p>Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:</p>
<p>Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */
    H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*
    Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */
    Z: read P/d/secret          = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */</p>
<p>So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has p…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38fm-jc3c-v2pm"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98976</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98976</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482813+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 105 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives     propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is     locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:     Z: umount2(P/d)             = EINVAL            /* the cover is locked */     H: mount X on P/d, umount X                     /* both propagate into Z /*     Z: umount2(P/d)             = 0                 /* the cover is now unlocked */     Z: read P/d/secret          = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98976"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152</id>
    <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4152 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T10:09:41.482940+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4152"/>
  </entry>
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