Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports

The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound:

data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size;

but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of.

The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds e…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports

The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound:

data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size;

but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of.

The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds e…

kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound: data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report); data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report); alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size; data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL); data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size; but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a 1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2 for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of. The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at &readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes reads out of bounds even w…

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen oder eine nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkung zu erzielen.