Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure

vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table:

vdev->msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!vdev->msi_perm) return -ENOMEM;

ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev->msi_perm, len, flags); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->msi_perm); return ret; /* vdev->msi_perm left dangling */ }

When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -> alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the error path frees vdev->msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in it. vdev->msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles, and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open.

That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device:

1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at "if (vdev->msi_perm) return len;" and reuses the freed object. MSI config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and call the freed perm->readfn / perm->writefn function pointers.

2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and kfree() on the already-freed object.

Fix it by NULLing vdev->msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and vfio_config_free().

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in…

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure

vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table:

vdev->msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!vdev->msi_perm) return -ENOMEM;

ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev->msi_perm, len, flags); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->msi_perm); return ret; /* vdev->msi_perm left dangling */ }

When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -> alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the error path frees vdev->msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in it. vdev->msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles, and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open.

That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device:

1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at "if (vdev->msi_perm) return len;" and reuses the freed object. MSI config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and call the freed perm->readfn / perm->writefn function pointers.

2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and kfree() on the already-freed object.

Fix it by NULLing vdev->msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and vfio_config_free().

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in…

kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge and 242 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: clear vdev->msi_perm after freeing it on init failure vfio_msi_cap_len() lazily allocates the per-device MSI permission table: vdev->msi_perm = kmalloc_obj(struct perm_bits, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!vdev->msi_perm) return -ENOMEM; ret = init_pci_cap_msi_perm(vdev->msi_perm, len, flags); if (ret) { kfree(vdev->msi_perm); return ret; /* vdev->msi_perm left dangling */ } When init_pci_cap_msi_perm() -> alloc_perm_bits() fails with -ENOMEM, the error path frees vdev->msi_perm but leaves the freed pointer stored in it. vdev->msi_perm is not re-zeroed later because struct vfio_pci_core_device is per-device and persists across open/close cycles, and the vfio_config_init() error path returns without calling vfio_config_free(). So the dangling pointer outlives the failed open. That leads to two use-after-frees on the same device: 1. Reuse. The next vfio_config_init() sees the stale pointer at "if (vdev->msi_perm) return len;" and reuses the freed object. MSI config accesses in vfio_pci_config_rw_single() then dereference and call the freed perm->readfn / perm->writefn function pointers. 2. Double free. A later vfio_config_free() runs free_perm_bits() and kfree() on the already-freed object. Fix it by NULLing vdev->msi_perm after the kfree(), matching the NULL-after-free discipline already used in free_perm_bits() and vfio_config_free(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vfio_pci_…

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Speicher zu beschädigen oder offenzulegen, den Kernel oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren oder Denial-of-Service-Zustände, einschließlich Kernel-Abstürzen, zu verursachen.