Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections

Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was.

Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events.

sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections

Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was.

Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events.

sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader.

Affected: openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize

The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw() of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.

A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index into it, causing a use-after-free.

The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-can…

kernel-devel-7.2.7-1.1 on GA media

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was. Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events. sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten oder den Systemzustand zu manipulieren, Denial-of-Service-Zustände herbeizuführen oder andere, nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.