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  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.219440+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-rclone-2026-88046</id>
    <title>BIT-rclone-2026-88046 — rclone: source object names can escape the configured root on upload</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.222774+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: rclone</p>
<p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, rclone core does not reject parent-directory segments in source Object.Remote() values before fs/list, fs/walk, fs/sync, and fs/operations pass those values to destination backends. A flat-keyspace source object store populated with native non-rclone tooling can contain a raw .. key segment, and affected b2, swift, qingstor, oracleobjectstorage, internetarchive, smb, storj, sftp, webdav, ftp, filelu, shade, and sia destinations use path.Join(root, remote) before EncodeDot can neutralize the segment. A copy or upload can therefore escape the configured root into another bucket, share, or path reachable by the victim credential, with sftp and smb potentially reaching other filesystem or share locations under the same login authority. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-rclone-2026-88046"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368627</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-368627</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.222825+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-368627</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368627"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88046</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-88046</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.222841+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, rclone core does not reject parent-directory segments in source Object.Remote() values before fs/list, fs/walk, fs/sync, and fs/operations pass those values to destination backends. A flat-keyspace source object store populated with native non-rclone tooling can contain a raw .. key segment, and affected b2, swift, qingstor, oracleobjectstorage, internetarchive, smb, storj, sftp, webdav, ftp, filelu, shade, and sia destinations use path.Join(root, remote) before EncodeDot can neutralize the segment. A copy or upload can therefore escape the configured root into another bucket, share, or path reachable by the victim credential, with sftp and smb potentially reaching other filesystem or share locations under the same login authority. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88046"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38xv-hf3p-h7mq</id>
    <title>GHSA-38xv-hf3p-h7mq — rclone: source object names can escape the configured root on upload</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.222867+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/rclone/rclone</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Multiple backends, when given a specially crafted object to copy, can escape the backend confinement.</p>
<p>| Backend | Keep/Close | Per-backend severity |
|---|---|---|
| sftp | Medium | Real filesystem escape, fires under default encoding. |
| smb | Low-Medium | Escapes to a different SMB share the credential can reach. |
| ftp | Low | Real, leading-`..` overshoot PoC is partly neutralized by encoding; escape bounded to at/below the login base. |
| webdav | Low | Server-side ACLs are the real boundary. |
| b2 | Low | Same-account sibling **bucket** crossing on a flat keyspace. |
| swift | Low | Same, container. |
| qingstor | Low | Same. |
| oracleobjectstorage | Low | Same. |
| internetarchive | Low | IA items are owner-writable only; confined to user's own items. |
| storj | Low | Can retarget a different bucket in the same access grant. |
| filelu | Low | Confined to the user's own account. |
| shade | Low | Confined to the user's own drive. |
| sia | Low | siad API password already grants full-daemon access. |</p>
<p>## Root cause</p>
<p>rclone core does **not** sanitize `..` in a source object's `Remote()` - verified: nothing in `fs/march`, `fs/sync`, `fs/list`, or `fs/operations` rejects `..` segments before the name reaches the destination backend's `Put`/`Update`/`Mkdir`. Confinement is therefore each backend's responsibility, and these backends join `root + remote` without a check.</p>
<p>This divides into two classes:</p>
<p>- **Bucket based backends** - `bucket.Split(path.Join(…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-38xv-hf3p-h7mq"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-88046</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-88046</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T00:23:01.222924+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: rclone</p>
<p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, rclone core does not reject parent-directory segments in source Object.Remote() values before fs/list, fs/walk, fs/sync, and fs/operations pass those values to destination backends. A flat-keyspace source object store populated with native non-rclone tooling can contain a raw .. key segment, and affected b2, swift, qingstor, oracleobjectstorage, internetarchive, smb, storj, sftp, webdav, ftp, filelu, shade, and sia destinations use path.Join(root, remote) before EncodeDot can neutralize the segment. A copy or upload can therefore escape the configured root into another bucket, share, or path reachable by the victim credential, with sftp and smb potentially reaching other filesystem or share locations under the same login authority. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-88046"/>
  </entry>
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