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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.667465+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-rclone-2026-88016</id>
    <title>BIT-rclone-2026-88016 — rclone: Directory metadata (chmod/chown/chtimes) applied through a planted symlink in rclone local --links escapes the…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.671312+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: rclone</p>
<p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, when backend/local runs with --links, a source .rclonelink object can plant a symlink in the destination and later directory metadata is applied through that path. MkdirMetadata, writeMetadataToFile, and setTimes operate when Directory.translatedLink=false, so os.Chown, os.Chmod, os.Chtimes, and birth-time handling can bypass os.Root confinement and follow the symlink. An attacker controlling source contents can therefore apply selected ownership, permissions, modification times, or birth times to a file or directory outside the destination, with --metadata required for chmod and chown while modification time is applied by the normal directory workflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-rclone-2026-88016"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368618</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-368618</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.671388+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-368618</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-368618"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88016</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-88016</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.671424+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, when backend/local runs with --links, a source .rclonelink object can plant a symlink in the destination and later directory metadata is applied through that path. MkdirMetadata, writeMetadataToFile, and setTimes operate when Directory.translatedLink=false, so os.Chown, os.Chmod, os.Chtimes, and birth-time handling can bypass os.Root confinement and follow the symlink. An attacker controlling source contents can therefore apply selected ownership, permissions, modification times, or birth times to a file or directory outside the destination, with --metadata required for chmod and chown while modification time is applied by the normal directory workflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88016"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f8g7-2xjc-7mfh</id>
    <title>GHSA-f8g7-2xjc-7mfh — rclone: Directory metadata (chmod/chown/chtimes) applied through a planted symlink in rclone local --links escapes the…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.671470+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/rclone/rclone</p>
<p>## Summary
With `-l/--links`, rclone's local backend recreates a source `.rclonelink` object as a real symlink at the destination **verbatim** (preserved by design for faithful backups). Directory-metadata application, however, does **not** go through the `os.Root` sandbox and does **not** use NOFOLLOW syscalls. A local `Directory` always has `translatedLink=false`, so when the destination path already exists as a planted symlink, rclone applies `chmod`/`chown`/`chtimes` **through** that symlink to a target **outside** the destination tree. An attacker who controls the source contents (malicious/compromised remote, shared bucket) obtains attacker-valued `chmod`/`chown`/`chtimes` of an arbitrary path outside the backup destination.</p>
<p>## Root Cause
- `MkdirMetadata` (`backend/local/local.go:895`) calls `f.lstat` (=`os.Lstat`, local.go:465) on the destination path. On a pre-planted symlink, `os.Lstat` succeeds, so the `errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist)` branch (local.go:896) that would create a real directory via the `os.Root`-guarded `f.Mkdir` is **not** taken. Instead a `Directory` is built directly on the symlink path.
- `writeMetadataToFile` runs raw `os.Chown` (`backend/local/metadata.go:131`) and `os.Chmod` (`metadata.go:158`); `setTimes` runs raw `os.Chtimes` (`backend/local/local.go:1318`).
- The CVE-2024-52522 NOFOLLOW fix (`os.Lchown`/`lChmod`/`lChtimes`) is gated on `if o.translatedLink` (metadata.go:128/150, local.go:1315). A `Directory` (`newDirectory`→`newObject` with…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f8g7-2xjc-7mfh"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-88016</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-88016</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T06:17:02.671602+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: rclone, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: rclone</p>
<p>rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. Prior to 1.75.1, when backend/local runs with --links, a source .rclonelink object can plant a symlink in the destination and later directory metadata is applied through that path. MkdirMetadata, writeMetadataToFile, and setTimes operate when Directory.translatedLink=false, so os.Chown, os.Chmod, os.Chtimes, and birth-time handling can bypass os.Root confinement and follow the symlink. An attacker controlling source contents can therefore apply selected ownership, permissions, modification times, or birth times to a file or directory outside the destination, with --metadata required for chmod and chown while modification time is applied by the normal directory workflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.75.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-88016"/>
  </entry>
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