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  <updated>2026-11-17T17:07:08.889891+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404751</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-404751</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T17:07:08.891622+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-404751</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404751"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87042</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-87042</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T17:07:08.891655+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The IEEE 1588 (PTP) port implementation in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c adopted the logMessageInterval field of a received Delay_Resp message without any validation. port_delay_resp_msg_process() stored the raw wire value (a full-range int8_t) into port_ds.log_min_delay_req_interval, and that value is later used as a shift count by port_timer_set_timeout() when the Delay_Req timer is armed. Values below about -30 truncate the computed timeout to zero, and values with a magnitude of 64 or more perform an undefined shift of a uint64_t; the standards-defined "not applicable" encoding 0x7F fell into the latter case as well.</p>
<p>PTP messages are received over unauthenticated link-local traffic (UDP multicast on 224.0.1.129, IPv6 multicast, or raw IEEE 802.3), and the handler accepts a Delay_Resp from any sender as long as the port is a time receiver using the end-to-end delay mechanism and the message echoes the port identity and a pending sequence id — both of which the victim itself broadcasts in its Delay_Req. Any node on the same link can therefore inject a single crafted Delay_Resp, or simply become the time transmitter and advertise the bogus interval.</p>
<p>Once the delay timer is armed with a zero timeout, the cooperative PTP thread re-arms and retransmits a Delay_Req on every tick. Each transmission takes a buffer from the fixed CONFIG_PTP_MSG_POLL_SIZE message slab (default 10) and holds it on port-&gt;delay_req_list for three seconds, so the slab is emptied within milliseconds and p…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-87042"/>
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