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EUVD-2026-369806

2026-10-03T14:41:29.613749+00:00

EUVD-2026-369806

fkie_cve-2026-85732

2026-10-03T14:41:29.613795+00:00

oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, the parseLink function in registry/remote/utils.go accepts an absolute URL from a registry-controlled Link response header without validating its scheme, host, or port. Tags, Referrers, and Repositories pagination operations then issue a GET request to the attacker-selected URL from the victim's network, allowing blind server-side request forgery against internal services. The response body is not returned to the attacker, but timing and error differences can reveal service reachability, and credentials may be attached when the credential store has an entry for the target host. Exploitation requires a victim to perform a pagination-based listing operation against a malicious registry. The maintainer identifies this report as a duplicate of GHSA-3hr5-mjrr-hfjh and states that remediation is consolidated in that earlier advisory. The consolidated issue is fixed in version 2.6.2.

GHSA-h7vf-4x9w-h99v — oras-go: Blind SSRF via unvalidated Link header URL in pagination allows internal network probing

2026-10-03T14:41:29.613835+00:00

Affected: Go: oras.land/oras-go/v2

## Summary

oras-go's pagination helper `parseLink()` in `registry/remote/utils.go` follows the `Link` response header from a registry without validating the URL's host or scheme. When a malicious registry returns a `Link` header containing an absolute URL pointing to an arbitrary host (e.g., a cloud metadata endpoint), the client makes GET requests to that host from the victim's network.

This affects all pagination-based listing operations: Tags, Referrers, and Repositories (catalog).

## Root Cause

`parseLink()` at `registry/remote/utils.go:54` calls `resp.Request.URL.Parse(link)` which, for absolute URLs, returns the absolute URL unchanged. The result is passed directly to the next pagination loop iteration where `http.NewRequestWithContext()` creates a GET request to the attacker-specified URL. No host comparison, scheme validation, or IP filtering exists between `parseLink` output and the HTTP request.

## Affected Code Paths

- `registry/remote/repository.go:Tags()` calls `parseLink()` for next page URL - `registry/remote/repository.go:Referrers()` calls `parseLink()` for next page URL - `registry/remote/registry.go:Repositories()` calls `parseLink()` for next page URL

## Impact

**Blind SSRF from the victim's network.** A malicious registry operator can force any oras-go client that lists tags, referrers, or repositories to issue GET requests to arbitrary internal endpoints:

- Cloud instance metadata endpoints for service discovery and IAM role enumeration - Inter…

openSUSE-SU-2026:11832-1 — helm3-3.22.0-1.1 on GA media

2026-10-03T14:41:29.613887+00:00

helm3-3.22.0-1.1 on GA media