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  <updated>2026-11-21T11:20:34.714710+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407055</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-407055</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:20:34.716708+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-407055</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407055"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77597</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-77597</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:20:34.716738+00:00</updated>
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        <p>iSponsorBlockTV is a SponsorBlock client for YouTube TV clients. Prior to 2.11.0, src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py trusts the SSDP LOCATION URL supplied by a local-network responder without validating its destination. During automatic discovery, this can cause an attacker-directed GET request and a constrained POST request to a path ending in /YouTube; the POST uses application-defined headers and an application-defined payload rather than attacker-selected request contents. The requests can reach internal services, but the detailed request behavior states that response data and errors are not returned to the attacker, making the demonstrated behavior blind SSRF with bounded integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-77597"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-56v3-jrq2-4q9m</id>
    <title>GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m — iSponsorBlockTV: SSRF via Malicious SSDP Response Spoofing in Local Device Discovery</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T11:20:34.716770+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: iSponsorBlockTV</p>
<p>### Summary
iSponsorBlockTV discovers local smart TV devices via SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol). The `LOCATION` URL from SSDP responses is used to fetch device capabilities without URL validation. A local network attacker can craft a malicious SSDP response with a `LOCATION` pointing to any internal HTTP service, causing SSRF when the application fetches device information.</p>
<p>### Details
In `src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py:92-96`, upon receiving an SSDP M-SEARCH response, the code extracts the `LOCATION` header and makes an HTTP GET request to that URL to retrieve DIAL device description XML. The URL is not validated against expected device IP ranges, expected schemes, or private/internal IP blocklists. Any device on the LAN (or a rogue WiFi access point) can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH queries with a `LOCATION` pointing to internal services.</p>
<p>### Impact
Blind SSRF against internal network services; access to home router admin interfaces, smart home controllers, NAS admin pages, and other local services; potential credential disclosure from fetched responses.
It'd be able to either:
- show a debug log  line `- __main__ - DEBUG - Discovered device at &lt;attacker controlled URL&gt;, processing...` (which is normally disabled and won't be shown in the actual configurator since textual doesn't show logs unless running in dev mode and launching a second terminal to inspect log output), and make a single GET request to an "attacker controlled" url which does not leak any infor…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-56v3-jrq2-4q9m"/>
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