Affected: Homebrew: aider

## Summary `Repo.init()` forwards `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

## Root Cause `Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `allow_unsafe_options`.

## Impact Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init` has no guard at all.

## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable) from git import Repo Repo.init(path, template="/evil") # next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE ```

## Attack Chain 1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable) and g…

GitPython before 3.1.58 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Repo.init that forwards unsafe git options without validation. Attackers can supply a template parameter pointing to a directory with malicious git hooks that execute arbitrary code when git operations are performed on the initialized repository.

Affected: PyPI: GitPython

## Summary `Repo.init()` forwards `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

## Root Cause `Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `allow_unsafe_options`.

## Impact Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init` has no guard at all.

## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable) from git import Repo Repo.init(path, template="/evil") # next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE ```

## Attack Chain 1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable) and g…

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-GitPython

GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing. Security Fix(es):

GitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)

GitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)

GitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to &apos;git rev-list&apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=&lt;path&gt;, causing &apos;git rev-list --output=&lt;path&gt;&apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process&apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)

GitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable env…

Security update for python-GitPython

Affected: PyPI: gitpython

## Summary `Repo.init()` forwards `**kwargs` verbatim to `git init` with no unsafe-option guard and no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter. `git init --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/*` into the new repo's `.git/hooks`, so an attacker-controlled `template` kwarg plants a hook that executes on the next git operation → arbitrary code execution. `--template` is already recognized as unsafe for clone (it is on `unsafe_git_clone_options`, and GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf covers the clone path), but `Repo.init` is a distinct method that never received a guard and needs an independent fix.

## Root Cause `Repo.init(path, mkdir, odbt, expand_vars, **kwargs)` is a bare `git.init(**kwargs)` (git/repo/base.py:1435) with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `allow_unsafe_options`.

## Impact Arbitrary code execution (hook fires on next git op) at the privileges of the host process. Two preconditions raise attack complexity (AC:H): the app must forward a `template=` kwarg (KEY control) AND the attacker must stage an executable hook directory at a known path — the same profile GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf accepted as HIGH for the clone path. Default `allow_unsafe_options` is irrelevant here because `Repo.init` has no guard at all.

## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages /evil/hooks/post-commit (executable) from git import Repo Repo.init(path, template="/evil") # next commit runs /evil/hooks/post-commit -> ACE ```

## Attack Chain 1. Entry: attacker stages `/evil/hooks/post-commit` (executable) and g…

jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy collection install via git clone (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332) aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options GitPython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration ruby-jwt: ruby-jwt: Authentication bypass due to empty key in HMAC verification jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via incomplete fix in async JSON parser aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP responses gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite and read via unsafe git option forwarding gitpython: GitPython: Information disclosure via environment variable expansion in URL handling gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git template gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via improper git option validation gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Exec…

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git

GitPython before 3.1.58 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Repo.init that forwards unsafe git options without validation. Attackers can supply a template parameter pointing to a directory with malicious git hooks that execute arbitrary code when git operations are performed on the initialized repository.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen und einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.