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  <updated>2026-11-22T20:31:34.170922+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409004</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-409004</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T20:31:34.172815+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-409004</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-409004"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75522</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-75522</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T20:31:34.172851+00:00</updated>
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        <p>OpenID4VP is an open-source credential parsing library for SD-JWT VC and mDOC/mDL formats. Prior to 0.8.1, src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts ChainBuilder.tryBuild() terminates chain construction when an attacker-controlled certificate Subject Distinguished Name equals a trusted anchor subject, without verifying cryptographic closure to the anchor public key. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a self-signed leaf or intermediate that reuses the trusted Subject Distinguished Name and have credentials signed by the attacker key accepted as issued by the trusted authority. The public src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts TrustEvaluator.evaluate() path compounds the error by matching a terminus through serialNumber and falling back to anchors[0], which can attribute the forged chain to genuine trusted-authority metadata. This issue is fixed in version 0.8.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75522"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4c2f-96cf-f5fc</id>
    <title>GHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc — OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verify…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-22T20:31:34.172896+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @openeudi/openid4vp</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`ChainBuilder` (the private RFC 5280 validator behind `TrustEvaluator` and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on **Subject Distinguished Name string equality** rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus **with no signature verification** against the anchor's public key.</p>
<p>An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>A relying party using `@openeudi/openid4vp` to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a **forged credential as genuine**, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.</p>
<p>Exploitable through the public verification path: `TrustEvaluator.evaluate()` returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor's metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>`src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts`, `tryBuild()`:</p>
<p>```js
while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify &amp; climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain;  // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor
```</p>
<p>The si…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4c2f-96cf-f5fc"/>
  </entry>
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